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Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) is considered a global leader both in trade and climate policies. 
Nonetheless, trade liberalisation has been widely criticised for its negative effects on the 
environment and for directly contributing to the rising levels of annual greenhouse gas 
emissions. This paper addresses the trade-climate nexus by assessing to what extent the 
EU is effectively integrating its environmental objectives within its trade policies. First, the 
legal spaces for the EU’s action in this policy nexus are identified. Second, the analysis 
looks into how effectively the EU is achieving its own set of objectives for trade and 
climate. The assessment draws on an innovative analytical matrix examining four Trade-
Climate Agenda items: (i) international competitiveness, (ii) climate-friendly goods and 
services, (iii) international aviation and maritime shipping, and (iv) product labelling and 
standards. The paper then evaluates to what extent the externalisation mechanisms of 
Manners’ ‘Normative Power Europe’ and Damro’s ‘Market Power Europe’ are deployed 
in order to achieve the above objectives. The findings show that the EU’s performance in 
the effective management of the nexus is overall moderate to weak. 
 
 
 
 
  
Simone Possenti 
4 
Introduction: The trade-climate nexus  
 
“We Europeans are the world leaders on climate action. It was Europe that brokered the 
first-ever legally binding, global climate deal. It was Europe that built the coalition of 
ambition that made agreement in Paris possible. […] it is about Europe’s global 
influence.”1 This is what Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker declared in the 
aftermath of the Paris Agreement, when the European Union (EU) went through a new 
momentum of relative leadership in global climate governance. The Guardian’s journalist 
Fiona Harvey went as far as calling it “the world’s greatest diplomatic success”.2 
 
The trade-climate nexus still has to be fully investigated, especially with regard to the EU 
as subject of reference. Indeed, both policies represent areas in which the EU portrays 
itself as a ‘global leader’. On the one hand, climate leadership is a self-declaration from 
the European side, which is relevant to define its identity. On the other hand, this 
leadership is also confirmed by factual data: the EU is the biggest investor worldwide in 
the fight against climate change – at least when compared to other governmental 
actors.3 In 2017 alone, € 20.4 billion were invested to support public climate finance in 
developing countries, particularly via the European Investment Bank.  
 
The EU is also a major global player when it comes to its single market and Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP). The EU accounts for the second largest share of gross domestic 
product after China, is the largest trader of both goods and services and the largest 
foreign investor (both as provider and destination). Moreover, the euro is the second most 
important currency for international transactions after the US dollar.4 In other words, the 
EU’s trade leadership cannot be as easily questioned as the environmental one. 
 
In simple terms, a nexus is a connection, a correlation. When it comes to the trade-climate 
nexus, the basic idea is that by increasing the domestic and international levels of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, trade has historically been one of the greatest sources 
                                                          
1 Commission President Juncker, “State of the EU” speech, 14 September 2016, retrieved 9 January 
2019 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm.  
2 “Paris climate change agreement: The world’s greatest diplomatic success”, The Guardian, 14 
December 2015, retrieved 7 November 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/ 
dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations.  
3 European Commission, “International climate finance”, November 2018, retrieved 6 April 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/finance_en. 
4 S. Gstöhl & D. De Bièvre, The Trade Policy of the European Union, London, Palgrave, 2018, pp. 4-
10. 
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of climate destabilisation. Indeed, scientific research has shown a positive correlation 
between reinforced trade relations and growing carbon emissions, except when they 
occur among the most developed nations.5 According to the International Transport 
Forum (ITF), “maritime transport emitted 938 Mt of CO₂ in 2012. This represented 2.6% of 
total global carbon emissions”; these numbers are expected to grow drastically by 2050, 
when carbon emissions due to seaborne trade flows may increase from 50% up to 250%, 
if a business-as-usual model is adopted.6 
 
Although trade has strongly undermined global climate stability, it recently started to be 
seen as a vehicle for establishing a normative framework to implement global 
decarbonisation, environmental protection and, eventually, to help mitigate climate 
change. The EU has been described as “perfectly placed to exploit this nexus within the 
realm of its external relations”.7 This is the particularly case for the so-called new 
generation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which began with the ratification of the EU-
South Korea FTA in late 2015. The EU-Japan FTA, which entered into force in February 2019, 
was the first one with a clause on the implementation of the Paris Agreement.8 
 
In the EU we witness a growing consciousness that “when trade policy is used as a foreign 
policy means, it requires a coherent pursuit of trade and non-trade objectives […] 
introducing energy and climate components in trade and investment agreements can 
promote the transfer of low-carbon technologies, and exchange best practices in terms 
of governance and regulatory regimes”.9  
 
Therefore, this paper aims to address the following research question: To what extent is 
the EU effectively managing the trade-climate nexus by using trade to support climate 
action in its external relations? Based on the answers to this question, the paper then 
                                                          
5 M. Hübler,“The inequality-emissions nexus in the context of trade and development: A quantile 
regression approach”, Ecological Economics, vol. 134, no. 10, 2017, pp. 174-185. 
6 International Transport Forum, “On Course Towards Carbon-neutral Shipping?”, retrieved 10 
January 2019, https://www.itf-oecd.org/carbon-neutral-shipping.  
7 R. Leal-Arcas & E. Alvarez Armas, “The climate-energy-trade nexus in EU external relations”, in S. 
Minas & V. Ntousas (eds.), EU Climate Diplomacy: Politics, Law and Negotiations. Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2018, p. 150. 
8 “EU and Japan ratify first FTA ever to include Paris Climate Agreement provision”, The European 
Sting, 24 July 2018, retrieved 10 April 2019, https://europeansting.com/2018/07/24/eu-and-japan-
ratify-first-fta-ever-to-include-paris-climate-agreement-provision.  
9 N. Tocci, “The EU in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex 
world”, in A. Missiroli (ed.), Towards an EU Global Strategy: Background, Process, References, Paris, 
Institut d’Etudes de sécurité de l’Union européenne, 2016, p. 150. 
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discusses how the EU could manage the trade-climate nexus more effectively in the 
future. Ultimately, the aim is to provide an assessment of the EU’s effectiveness, that is, 
how successfully it applies the trade tools at its disposal to reach its own climate-related 
objectives. The paper argues that the EU’s effectiveness is overall moderate to weak, 
mostly due to a lack of clear prioritisation and a weak use of market power instruments.  
 
Framework of analysis 
 
The tools that the EU has at its disposal in its external action are derived from the 
mechanisms of Manners’ ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) and Damro’s ‘Market Power 
Europe’ (MPE). NPE captures the idea that the EU can shape, via its own normative 
framework, the perception of ‘what is normal’ for both internal and external actors. It is a 
source of identity, based on the rejection of nationalism, imperialism and war, on its 
unique character as ‘hybrid polity’, and on the long-term development of values in the 
Treaties and in practice. The EU externalises these norms by applying a variety of diffusion 
mechanisms.10  
 
MPE, instead, stems from the idea that the power of the EU essentially emanates from the 
size of the single market, its regulatory capacity and its function as an arena of interest 
contestation. It is not only about the EU as a pro-market, neoliberal actor, but also about 
setting market regulations. Damro considers how the EU exercises its power by 
externalising its own standards and rules, both intentionally and unintentionally, and via 
either persuasive or coercive tools.11 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, all elements will be combined into a total of 12 tools, which 
are not mutually exclusive but offer the most comprehensive overview of what the EU can 
do to manage the trade-climate nexus. Table 1 provides the complete list of the 12 tools, 
accompanied by a brief definition and an illustrative example. 
 
  
                                                          
10 I.J. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258.  
11 C. Damro, “Market power Europe: exploring a dynamic conceptual framework”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 9, 2015, pp. 1336-1354. 
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Table 1 Tools employable in the trade-climate nexus for EU external action 
Tools Definition Example 
Contagion - unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU 
to other political actors 
- influence of the EU on African Union 
developments 
Informational 
diffusion 
- strategic communication from the main EU 
institutions 
- EU Global Strategy 2016: climate change 
identified as a security threat and call for 
more integrated policies12 
- Juncker’s State of EU speech 2016: affirming 
EU leadership against climate change13 
Procedural 
diffusion 
- institutionalisation of a relationship; specific 
monitoring and dispute settlement 
mechanisms 
- Institutionalised dialogues: regulatory 
dialogues and high-level strategic dialogues 
- Trade and sustainable development 
committee (TSDC) 
- Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) 
- Civil society forum (CSF) 
- Summits of Ministers 
- Committee of Ambassadors 
- Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
Transference - EU trade, aid or technical assistance to third 
parties 
- environmental integration in external 
assistance (development cooperation) 
- facilitating transfer of green technologies, 
renewables, high-level education 
- e.g. Maritime Technology Cooperation 
Centres (joint Commission-IMO) 
Overt diffusion - physical presence of EU 
- growing relevance and presence of EU: 
‘leadiator’ 
- activities of EU Delegations 
- EU role at COP21 Paris negotiations and 
similar multilateral settings (e.g. WTO 
Environmental Goods Agreement)  
Cultural filter - interplay between the construction of 
knowledge and the creation of social and 
political identity 
- trade-climate nexus in EU public diplomacy 
- may affect effectiveness in terms of 
learning, adapting or rejecting from third 
parties 
- present for environmental-climate 
negotiations in general, but weak trade 
linkage  
- e.g. are climate norms seen differently in 
China/US than in the EU? 
Persuasion - intentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to 
other politico-economic actors 
- ‘leading by example’ 
- Large internal acquis (over 400 pieces of 
environmental legislation) 
Coercion - imposition of EU regulation on third parties - unilateral choices (GSP+ requirements) 
Conditionality - unilateral instrument, positive or negative - special incentive arrangements under the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP); 
also new ex ante conditionality for FTAs, e.g. 
EU-Japan including the Paris Agreement 
- withdrawals from GSP, GSP+ 
Legal 
approximation 
- convergence of national laws towards EU 
laws 
- Eastern Partnership, Euro-Med Partnership 
(ENP countries) 
Partial 
adoption of 
acquis 
- requiring a third party to partially adopt 
some of the EU-internal legislation 
 
- European Economic Area (EEA) 
- enlargement 
- Stabilisation and Association Agreements  
Regulatory 
standards 
- defining a set of environmental standards 
for cooperation and/or integration across all 
policy areas. Environmental integration and 
cooperation clauses 
- general and/or specific exception clauses 
- extended trade-climate issue linkage  
- Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) 
Source: Compiled by the author, based on concepts from Normative Power Europe (Manners, 
2002) and Market Power Europe (Damro, 2015). 
 
                                                          
12 F. Mogherini, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”, European Union Global 
Strategy, June 2016. 
13 Juncker, “State of the EU”, op. cit. 
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The paper links these 12 tools to a set of EU objectives. The evaluation of the use of each 
tool will be based on a literature review of both primary and secondary sources. 
Henceforth, the next section presents the legal basis in the Treaties for the EU to build up 
a nexus among the climate and trade policy areas: on this basis, it will be possible to 
identify what the EU’s objectives in this nexus are. 
 
A glance at the Treaties: A weak acknowledgement of the nexus  
 
In order to understand the EU’s objectives, it is necessary to look at how the legal 
provisions in the Treaties allow the EU to be a relevant actor regarding this policy nexus. 
The Lisbon Treaty foresees one major difference between what the EU can do in trade 
and in climate: the CCP is an exclusive competence (Art. 3 (1) TFEU) but the environment, 
energy and transports are all competences shared with the member states (Art. 4 (2) 
TFEU). This is reflected in different structures of decision-making also during international 
negotiations. Art. 11 TFEU reads that “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development” [emphasis added]; this is 
quite relevant regarding the management of policy nexi.  
 
Nonetheless, Art. 21(2)(f) TEU specifically states: “The Union shall define and pursue 
common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields 
of international relations, in order to: […] (f) help develop international measures to 
preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management 
of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development (emphasis 
added). 
 
On this basis, there seems to be the potential to tackle the trade-climate nexus with third 
parties and in multilateral fora. Nevertheless, a clear prioritisation is lacking: what is meant 
by ‘high degree of cooperation’? How is sustainable development defined? Is 
combating climate change an essential part of it? Would certain trade barriers be 
necessary in order to keep temperatures below 2°C? 
 
In international relations, when not defined otherwise, the common definition of 
sustainability is still the one given in the Brundtland Report of 1987: “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
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meet their own needs”.14 This definition has been widely criticised for its enormous 
ambiguity when it comes to the definition of ‘needs’ and because of the difficulty to 
predict how the planet will look like in an undefined ‘future’. The EU has never clearly 
expressed whether it is taking a position of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ sustainability, but it largely 
seems to adopt the ‘People, Planet, Profit’ (PPPs) approach, where the environment is 
seen as a component of sustainable development on an equal footing with the social 
and economic dimensions. This creates a misunderstanding of prerogatives for the 
sustainable support of life on the planet and deep obstacles to prioritisation.15  
 
This approach constitutes a contradiction in terms for many scholars and environmental 
activists.16 The Stockholm Resilience Centre outlined that a more scientific and evidence-
based perspective entails another representation of the sustainability dimensions, giving 
priority to the natural ecosystems.17 Trade, as a key element of modern economy, should 
therefore be functional to people and to the environment.18 It is difficult to say that this is 
what globalised trade is doing in today’s world, when there is evidence that the related 
GHG emissions have almost doubled from 1990 to 2008,19 while the supposed social 
benefits of global trade still remain largely disputable for a large part of the world’s 
population.20  
 
Although Europeans have managed to reach a general agreement on the necessity to 
combat climate change, a common position about what this entails when linked to other 
policy areas, such as trade, is still quite dim. Everyone cares for trade and climate as two 
separate issues, but the trade-climate nexus is yet to be built. 
 
                                                          
14 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1987. 
15 T. Kuhlman & J. Farrington, “What is Sustainability?”, Sustainability, vol. 2, no. 11, 2010, pp. 3436-
3448. 
16 F. Vizeu et al., “Por uma crítica ao conceito de desenvolvimento sustentável”, Cad. EBAPE.BR, 
vol. 10, no. 3, 2012, pp. 569-583. 
17 Stockholm Resilience Centre, “Contributions to the Agenda 2030”, November 2016, retrieved 10 
April 2019, https://www.stockholmre- silience.org/policy--practice/contributions-to-the-agenda-
2030.html. 
18 J. O. Andersson, & M. Lindroth, “Ecologically Unsustainable Trade”, Ecological Economics, vol. 37, 
no. 1, 2001, pp. 113-122. 
19 G.P. Peters et al., “Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008”, PNAS 
Early Edition, 2011, p. 3. 
20 M. Eton et al., “Globalization and its implications on the growth of Small Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in Western Uganda: a case of selected districts in Western Uganda”, International Journal 
of Research in Management, Economics and Commerce, vol. 9, no. 2, 2019, pp. 7-16. 
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The EU’s objectives: an institutionalist viewpoint 
 
Title XX of the Lisbon Treaty, with three articles (Art. 191, 192, 193 TFEU) specifically on the 
environment, needs to be compared with Title II on the CCP in order to depict the EU 
objectives in the trade-climate nexus and not only in one of the two policies. Art. 191(1) 
TFEU states the four objectives of the Union policy on the environment. Although 
combatting climate change as a ‘constitutional’ matter is undoubtedly a big step 
forward (Art. 191(1)(d) TFEU), the language remains vague and it is not clear how these 
objectives will be turned into practical policies: which order of priorities should be 
envisaged vis-à-vis other EU objectives?  
 
Regarding the CCP, Art. 206 TFEU defines the objective of the EU customs union: “the 
Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world 
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct 
investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers”. And here comes the critical 
question: is this really compatible with the environmental protection needed to combat 
climate change? Should we not rather have some targeted restrictions on international 
trade (thus less liberalisation), if we really want to ensure attaining some of the objectives 
stated in Art. 191(1) TFEU? 
 
The scientific literature has already shown that global trade is a major cause of 
environmental damage and increasing GHG emissions.21 Art. 191(3) TFEU states that “[i]n 
preparing its policy on the environment, the Union shall take account of available 
scientific and technical data”, which supposedly means that the EU shall be a science- 
and evidence-based actor. Nevertheless, both trade and environmental policies shall be 
subject to the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action (Art. 207(1) TFEU). 
There are at least three general objectives that are hereby relevant (Art. 21(2) TEU): 
− foster sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; 
− encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; 
                                                          
21 E.G. Hertwich et al., “Carbon Footprint of Nations: A Global, Trade-Linked Analysis”, 
Environmental Science & Technology, vol. 43, no. 16, 2009, pp. 6414-6420. 
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− help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in 
order to ensure sustainable development.22 
 
Once again, there are no clear prioritisations or univocal definitions, and it almost seems 
to be taken for granted that there is a trade-climate nexus, but Europe did not manage 
to find an agreement on how the two policy areas should actually work to serve each 
other. Furthermore, global trade is presented in a very positive language, almost as an 
altruist action, while there are many controversies about this topic, and many scholars 
would say that globalisation has proven to be negative for many developing countries23 
as well as for many industrialised European economies which are facing massive 
unemployment.24 This  
“conceptual marriage of ‘environment’ and ‘development’ [… is] unwilling to 
reconsider the logic of competitive productivism which is at the root of the Planet’s 
ecological plight, it reduces ecology to a set of managerial strategies aiming at 
resource efﬁciency and risk management. It treats as a technical problem what in 
fact amounts to no less than a civilizational impasse – namely, that the level of 
productive performance already achieved turns out to be not viable in the North, 
let alone for the rest of the globe”25.  
 
Trade seems to be automatically compatible with ’sustainable development’, a concept 
which has been widely criticised for the easiness by which it can be used to justify almost 
anything.26 
 
In light of these legal limitations, it is important to acknowledge what kind of actor the EU 
is when interpreted from a theoretical perspective of the trade-climate nexus. Clapp and 
Dauvergne identified four main schools, summarised in Table 2: the EU is mainly an 
                                                          
22 European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012, Art. 21 (2) TEU, [emphasis added]. 
23 G. Rist, The History of Development: from Western origins to global faith, London, Zed Books, 2008, 
3rd edn, pp. 277. 
24 L. Labrianidis, “Social Consequences of Delocalization in Labour-Intensive Industries: The 
Experience of Old and New Members of the EU”, The Moving Frontier, London, Routledge, 2016, 
pp. 123-144. 
25 W. Sachs, “Environment”, in W. Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary, London, Zed Books, 
2010, 2nd edn, p. 35.  
26 L. Haddad, “Development Narratives: Recent Trends and Future Needs”, Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, issue 3, March 2008. 
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institutionalist actor, exposed to the lobbying of both market liberals and social greens.27 
Indeed, it was born as a promoter of trade liberalisation, thus it intrinsically sees trade as 
a positive element, but at the same time the EU constantly plays the role of trade 
regulator both in its internal and external market relations. 
Table 2 Trade-climate nexus: four main theoretical schools 
 
Market liberals Institutionalists Social greens Bio-environmentalists 
Trade must be free to 
deliver the best results 
Trade must be regulated 
to be good 
Socio-environmental 
issues take priority 
over trade 
Trade is intrinsically bad 
for people and planet 
 via comparative 
advantage, trade is 
an engine for 
development 
 
 trade provides 
efficient allocation of 
resources 
 
 trade creates and 
redistributes wealth 
in society 
 
 belief in the Invisible 
Hand 
 
 environmental 
degradation is an 
externality 
 
 trade creates 
prosperity and 
efficiencies 
 
 there are 
undesirable 
implications of trade 
on the environment, 
which call for 
regulations 
 
 institutions can 
deliver rules to adjust 
the global 
economic system, 
accounting for 
externalities 
 
 need for clauses in 
FTAs, multilateralism 
would be the best 
solution 
 advocacy for 
social and 
climate justice 
 
 trade can be 
good only if we 
all have the
 same high 
standards of 
labour rights and 
environmental 
protection 
 
 criticism of neo- 
colonialism 
 
 need to refuse 
trade (strong 
discrimination) 
 short-sighted 
exploitation of nature 
as root cause of 
environmental crisis 
 
 need for very strong 
regulations, to buy 
only local and 
certified sustainable 
goods 
 
 trade is exploitation of 
developing countries 
 
 WTO principles are 
wrong 
 
 criticism of 
anthropocentric views 
Source: author’s own compilation based on Clapp & Dauvergne, op.cit., 2011. 
 
Bearing in mind this ‘institutionalist’ perspective will allow a better understanding of the EU 
objectives on the trade-climate nexus and, subsequently, how they are translated into a 
European policy agenda for external action.  
 
  
                                                          
27 J. Clapp & P. Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global 
Environment, Boston, MIT Press, 2011, pp. 127-160. 
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Translating EU objectives into a policy agenda 
 
Several years ago, a comparative study conducted by Brewer looked at different 
international actors, such as the World Trade Organisation, the United Nations, the World 
Bank and the EU, and identified the items on the joint trade-climate agenda.28 Inspired 
by this study, I derived a list of 10 Trade-Climate Agenda (TCA) items29. For the purpose of 
this paper, only the following four, selected for their relevance within EU policies, will be 
analysed: 
 
i. Addressing international competitiveness 
The creation of high EU environmental standards for its internal market could damage its 
own industries if imported products do not respect the same high standards. On the 
European market, competition policy needs to ensure that companies always offer ‘the 
best possible range of goods’ at ‘the best possible prices’ in a fair way,30 otherwise non-
compliance with environmental regulations will increase delocalisation of polluting 
industries and job losses, from those who respect the rules to those who do not. 
 
ii. Climate-friendly goods and services 
The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session received the mandate 
to clarify the definition of environmental goods. It encountered considerable difficulties: 
notably, China wanted to include ‘bicycles’, which was a red-line for the EU.31 In general, 
solar panels or wind turbines are considered as the most common climate-friendly goods, 
while climate-friendly services could be loans and banking services for climate finance, 
for instance. 
 
                                                          
28 T.L. Brewer, “Trade policies and climate change policies: a rapidly expanding joint agenda”, The 
World Economy, vol. 33, no. 6, 2010, pp. 799-809. 
29 See Table 3 for the full list, and for further information refer to: S. Possenti, “The trade-climate 
nexus in the EU’s external relations. Assessing the European institutionalist approach”, Master thesis 
presented at the College of Europe, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy 
Studies, May 2019.  
30 European Commission, “What is competition policy?”, April 2012, retrieved 27 October 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/what_en.html.  
31 M. Musch & F. De Ville, “Paradigms in the trade-climate nexus: ‘liberal environmentalism’, the 
Environmental Goods Agreement and the role of the EU”, Europe and the World: A law review, 
vol. 2, no. 1, 2019, pp. 1-13. 
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iii. International aviation and maritime shipping 
Transportation is an essential, albeit very polluting part of trade. Environmental and labour 
standards in shipbuilding companies are different around the world, and issues of energy 
sources and waste management are yet to be addressed coherently. If EU companies, 
ports and airports had heavy environmental requirements that non-EU companies would 
not have, this could undermine competitiveness. 
 
iv. Product labelling and standards; 
The International Standards Organisation (ISO), which issues the famous ISO certifications, 
divides environmental standards in three categories: (i) life-cycle labels or eco-labels are 
the result of an analysis of all the impacts that a product has on the environment 
throughout its life, from production to consumption; (ii) voluntary single issue labels and 
certification schemes describe a specific attribute in the life cycle of a product, e.g. a 
can of tuna labelled ‘dolphin safe’; and finally (iii) the mandatory single issue labels as a 
requirement that usually regards the exact content of the product − a relevant topic, for 
instance, for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the agri-food business −, the 
recyclability, emissions and energy consumption.32 EU eco-labelling, for instance, has 
been considered by developing countries as a trade barrier.33 Moreover, “eco-labelling 
schemes depend for their effectiveness on market mechanisms. They can produce results 
generally consistent with those achieved by internationalization and the polluter-pays 
principle. Lastly, labelling schemes can effectuate the precautionary principle and the 
theory of optimum policy intervention”.34 
 
Having identified a list of 12 externalisation tools available to the EU, and 4 selected TCA 
items whose best achievement can be interpreted as the most viable way for the EU to 
address the trade-climate nexus coherently with all the requirements in the Treaties, it is 
now necessary to link the two in order to analyse the EU’s effectiveness in the 
management of this policy nexus.  
 
  
                                                          
32 A. E. Appleton, Environmental Labelling Programmes: International Trade Law Implications, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, pp. 3-11. 
33 L. Krämer, EU Environmental Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011, 2nd edn, p. 245. 
34 Appleton, 1997, op. cit., p. 15. 
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Assessment of EU effectiveness in the external trade-climate nexus 
 
The EU is an effective actor in managing the trade-climate nexus if it is successful in 
adopting and promoting the TCA items at the international level. Henceforth, it is 
important to remember that this paper is not assessing whether achieving all these TCA 
items would be enough to combat climate change. Instead, it is gauging the extent to 
which the EU is effective in reaching its own goals, according to its own (institutionalist) 
vision of the trade-climate nexus. In this sense, it is fair to say that the list of the TCA items 
depends on the theoretical understanding that the EU has of the problem, and it would 
probably be different if the EU was entirely market liberal or environmentalist. 
 
The analysis below should be read making constant reference to Table 3: all the 10 TCA 
items have been analysed therein, but for the purpose of this paper only a selection of 
them will be presented in detail.35 I will proceed by assessing the deployment of the 12 
tools already presented in the analytical framework. For each of them I will assign a 
numerical value as follows: 0 if that tool is not applicable or not available; 1 if it is rather 
weak; 2 when medium/moderate; and 3 when it is strong. The last column on the right 
sums up the degree of effectiveness for each TCA item: the range 0-12 will be considered 
as weak, 13-24 as moderate and 25-36 as strong. Meanwhile, the last row on the bottom 
will show how effectively one specific tool is used: 0-10 will be weak, 11-20 moderate and 
21-30 strong.  
 
 
                                                          
35 For further details refer to: S. Possenti, Master thesis, op. cit.  
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 Table 3: Degree of EFFECTIVENESS of the use of tools per TCA item  
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International competitiveness 
 
International competitiveness is one of the main concerns for the EU, and that is also why 
it results as the second highest ranking item on the agenda. Competition policy is an 
exclusive legal competence (Art. 3(1)(b) TFEU), “perhaps the most supranational of all EU 
policies”.36 Although competition was originally agreed as one of the so-called Singapore 
issues, after the collapse of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003, it is no 
longer linked to the international WTO agenda but it is either addressed in bilateral (or 
unilateral) ways, or discussed in less binding fora, such as the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the International Competition Network 
(ICN).37 This is perhaps explained by the fact that “in the last few decades, interest in 
competition policy has exploded: over a hundred countries now have competition laws 
compared to around twenty in the 1980s”.38  
 
Even if contagion is not easy to evaluate, because of its unintentional nature, the 
influence of the EU on other regional (e.g. Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa COMESA, Southern Common Market, Caribbean Community) or national (e.g. 
Western Balkans) policy actors is undeniable. For instance, the way in which Bosnia and 
Herzegovina deals with merger control and antitrust enforcement is largely derived from 
the EU model.39 The same goes for the 2016 reform of the COMESA Competition 
Commission, and in November of the same year the East African Community (EAC) 
Competition Authority appointed its first ever commissioners mirroring the EU. Moreover, 
the competition articles 88 to 90 in the WAEMU Treaty (Economic Community of West 
African States) are clearly built on the EU expertise.40 
                                                          
36 M. Cini & L. McGowan, Competition Policy in the European Union, New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2nd edn, 2009, p. 1. 
37 C. Damro & E. Ibáñez. “EU external engagement in areas with long-standing internal policies: 
Single market, competition policy and environmental policy”, in C. Damro, S. Gstöhl & S. Schunz 
(eds.), The European Union’s Evolving External Engagement: Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies?, 
New York, Routledge, 2018, pp. 37- 65. 
38 U. Aydin, “Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order”, paper 
for the Biennial Conference of the EUSA, Los Angeles, 23-25 April 2009, pp. 1-29. 
39 D. Gajin, “Competition Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2018”, published 20 January 2019, 
retrieved  4 April 2019, https://www.gajin.rs/2019/01/competition-law-in-bosnia-2018/. 
40 N. Altini, “African Competition Law Update”, Global Compliance News, published 7 April 2017, 
retrieved 4 April 2019, https://globalcompliancenews.com/african-competition-law-update-
20170407. 
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Contagion remains moderate, nonetheless, because so far it seems to be limited to areas 
with a weaker bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, while specific reference to climate in 
competitiveness is often difficult to prove. 
 
Informational diffusion is quite weak since the activities and communications of the 
Competitiveness Council (COMPET)41 and of DG Competition42 are very much oriented 
towards the internal market, largely neglecting to make reference to their external 
implications.  
 
Conversely, procedural diffusion is strong, as the EU has strong bi- and multilateral 
institutionalised dialogues with third countries and other regional markets regarding 
competition, while its overt diffusion, especially through the EU Delegations, is also very 
relevant. Nonetheless, the latter remains moderate as long as the EU does not have a 
status comparable to state actors in certain fora such as the UN or the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). Overall, the presence of the EU in both trade and environmental 
fora worldwide has been growing and has become more formalised with the Lisbon 
Treaty.43 
 
“The EU has regularly exercised coercion on non-EU firms in individual competition 
cases”:44 coercion is particularly strong when it comes to the regulation of abuses of 
dominant positions, state aid and merger policy. Even if the relevance for the trade-
climate nexus is not easy to detect, the potential for strong unilateral actions is there: this 
is one of the few areas where the EU has been facing head-on other powers such as the 
US or China. 
 
Conditionality is weakly applied in competition policy, partially because it is mainly used 
towards countries which do not yet represent a ‘danger’ for EU companies, that is, mainly 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries via GSP and GSP+ systems.  
 
                                                          
41 EU Council, “Competitiveness Council configuration (COMPET)”, January 2019, retrieved 4 April 
2019, https://www.consil- ium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/compet. 
42 European Commission, “Competition>Energy and environment”, January 2019, retrieved 4 April 
2019, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html. 
43 Delreux, 2013, op. cit., pp. 287-306. 
44 Damro & Ibáñez, 2018, op. cit. 
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In a similar way, the legal approximation has exerted influence in geographical areas 
that have a weaker bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, but that are intrinsically linked to 
the European market, such as the neighbourhood, some ACP countries and the EU 
membership candidates. The partial adoption of the acquis is even more restricted, thus 
weak, to countries such as members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
especially in the EEA.45  
 
When it comes to regulatory standards in competition, they can be considered as of 
medium effectiveness, because they vary across different environmental integration and 
cooperation negotiation strategies and clauses in agreements. The more powerful the EU 
is vis-à-vis the third party – in terms of market size, wealth and political power –, the more 
it seems able to enforce its own rules.46 
 
In general, the EU’s effectiveness in international competitiveness related to climate 
action is moderately high. 
 
Climate-friendly goods and services 
 
The trade of climate-friendly goods and services has been under discussion both in 
multilateral and bilateral fora. This is the reason why procedural diffusion is strong: there is 
a high degree of institutionalised dialogue in this realm, and the EU is the direct interface 
representing also all the member states at the WTO. Nonetheless, when it comes to action, 
overt diffusion is moderate although the EU played a key role in launching the 
Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations in the WTO, the trade-climate nexus was 
soon abandoned in favour of a ‘trade only’ approach.47 The EU is physically strongly 
present, but its leading role in managing the nexus is quite weak.  
 
Transference is equally moderate because what is missing is the nexus itself: “The EU, its 
Member States and the European Investment Bank are together the biggest contributor 
of public climate finance to developing countries, giving € 20.4 billion in 2017 alone.”48 
                                                          
45 A. Buzogány, “Neighbourhood Countries: Promoting Environmental Protection Close to Home”, 
in C. Adelle, K. Biedenkopf & D. Torney (eds.), European Union External Environmental Policy: 
Rules, Regulation and Governance beyond Borders, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan at Springer, 
2018, pp. 233-252. 
46 Leal-Arcas & Alvarez Armas, 2018, op. cit. 
47 Musch & De Ville, 2019, op. cit. 
48 European Commission, “International climate finance”, op.cit. 
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Nobody can neglect the relevance of EU investments for climate mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries, but often, as it is the case for the flagship initiative 
Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+), the transference foreseen in these 
programmes lacks a trade dimension, thus risking to involuntarily support the South-to-
North dependency.49 
 
The EU has, to a certain extent, also used coercion in order to protect its own system of 
technology patents and environmental goods producers. This was sometimes done via 
the WTO, as for the infamous case against Ontario’s Green Energy and Green Economy 
Act, which turned out in a Japan- and EU-led disruption of the Canadian local solar panel 
transition.50 The GSP+ requires to ratify 8 Multilateral Environmental Agreements, none of 
which deals directly with environmental goods and services; indeed, they are not part of 
the list of products whose trade is facilitated by this system.51 
 
Regarding the legal approximation and partial adoption of the acquis, the EU is a rather 
weak player because its influence is very limited to the neighbourhood and enlargement 
countries, but there has not been a real push regarding climate-friendly goods and 
services yet.52 Regulatory standards are more considerable because they set some 
internal targets for energy efficiency and for the share of renewable energy that entails 
a collateral impact on trade, but there is no specific standard though for the trade-
climate nexus.  
 
International transport 
 
International transport has dramatically increased during the last decades with a direct 
correlation to the growth of globalised trade. Aviation and maritime shipping are mainly 
addressed in two different multilateral fora: the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) based in Montréal and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) based in 
London. In neither of them the EU is recognised as a full member, the overt diffusion thus 
                                                          
49 GCCA+, “Our programmes”, retrieved 6 April 2019, http://www.gcca.eu/programmes 
50 N. Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, London, Penguin Books, 2014, pp. 
64-69. 
51 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 25 October 2012 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 
No 732/2008, Official Journal of the European Union, L 303, 31.10.2012, Annex V and VIII. 
52 G.M. Durán & E. Morgera, Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Relations, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2012, pp. 72-73. 
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being quite weak. There is an EU Office for the ICAO that works closely with the EU 
Delegation to Canada: the EU is an ad-hoc observer in many ICAO bodies, but it has no 
status in the ICAO Council. “The Office’s main task is the strengthening of the relationship 
between the EU and ICAO, focusing on aviation safety, security, environment, air traffic 
management and air transportation.”53 
 
At the IMO the EU is an observer with a permanent representative, and the real work 
rather concerns agreements of cooperation for the implementation of common 
projects.54 The EU is a contracting party to some relevant maritime conventions, such as 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), whose provisions are 
directly enforceable in the EU: thus, the Commission has to coordinate the positions of the 
member states in coherence with EU law.55 Overall, the procedural diffusion is moderate, 
because the institutionalisation of this policy area is still not fully open to the EU, and even 
at the bilateral level it still remains quite marginal. 
 
Transference has been increasing in the last years. An example is the Capacity Building 
for Climate Mitigation in the Maritime Shipping Industry, a flagship initiative commonly 
known as Global MTCC Network (GMN). This is a project that aims at increasing the 
collaboration between Maritime Technology Cooperation Centres (MTCCs) in specific 
target areas more in need of technology transfer. The project is designed and funded by 
the EU and operated via the IMO.56 
 
Contagion and persuasion appear to be rather weak. This is partly because the main EU 
strategy has been to push for the introduction of a market-based measure for shipping 
within the IMO, based on the principle of a cap-and-trade system: so far this brought only 
few (in)voluntary reactions.57  
                                                          
53 European Commission, “The European Union at ICAO”, DG MOVE, March 2019, retrieved 8 April 
2019, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/european_community_ 
icao_en 
54 IMO, “Intergovernmental Organizations which have concluded agreements of cooperation with 
IMO”, January 2019, retrieved 8 April 2019, http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/ 
IGOsWithObserverStatus.aspx 
55 European Commission, “Maritime: International Cooperation and Coordination”, DG MOVE, 
March 2019, retrieved 8 April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/ 
international_en 
56 GMN, retrieved 8 April 2019, https://gmn.imo.org 
57 P. Franc & L. Sutto, “Impact analysis on shipping lines and European ports of a cap-and-trade 
system on CO₂ emissions in maritime transport”, TRB Annual Meeting, Paper for the French 
Government, 2012, pp. 1-17. 
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Informational diffusion is medium, although many studies and statements on the topic are 
freely accessible, it seems that there are some discrepancies across different institutional 
communications (notably the ENVI Committee and DG CLIMA show positions rather 
opposed to those of DG TRADE and the Trade Policy Committee). The EU has been 
exercising strong coercion in the aviation sector with the imposition of the EU emissions 
trading system (EU ETS), including non-European airlines operating in Europe since 2012.58 
Nonetheless, a similar strong move did not come for seaborne trade, since, according to 
estimates, such a unilateral move could damage the competitiveness of European ports, 
while causing carbon leakage and increasing the price of products and raw materials.59 
Regarding regulatory standards, the EU action remains weak, while in general the legal 
approximation and pushing towards the EU legislation is not implemented in this field: on 
the contrary, it is the international law that is directly transposed into EU law.60 
 
Seaborne trade accounts for about 90% of global trade, therefore it is vital to the 
functioning of the global economy.61 In order to effectively achieve its trade objectives 
of continuous growth and trade expansion, the EU is bound to support maritime trade 
flows. Meanwhile, “in the baseline scenario international transport would be responsible 
for almost 40% of the available global CO₂ emissions in 2050. If all technological and 
operational improvements deliver the expected impact, the sectors would still be 
responsible for 25% of global permissible CO₂ emissions of a 2°C path”.62 Although aviation 
is not among the main drivers of climate change today, the estimates of its growth 
suggest it may constitute a major issue over the coming decades, with predicted 
emissions growth of 300-700% by 2050 – most of which is now happening in Asia and Latin 
America.63 The ICAO Resolution of October 2016, which approved the Carbon Offsetting 
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) as a market-based 
                                                          
58 European Commission, “Reducing emissions from aviation”, DG CLIMA, March 2019, retrieved 8 
April 2019, https://ec.eu- ropa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation_en. 
59 Franc & Sutto, 2012, op. cit., p. 15. 
60 IP/A/ENVI/2016-13, op. cit. 
61 International Chamber of Shipping, “Shipping, World Trade and the Reduction of CO₂ emissions”, 
UNFCCC COP20 Lima, 2014. 
62 European Parliament, “Emission Reduction Targets for International Aviation and Shipping”, 
Study for the ENVI Committee, IP/A/ENVI/2015-11, 2015, p. 26. 
63 G. Alonso et al., “Investigations on the distribution of air transport traffic and CO₂ emissions within 
the European Union”, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 36, issue C, 2014, pp. 85-93. 
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mechanism with the aim of stabilising CO₂ emissions at 2020 levels, was seen as a victory 
by the EU, which immediately committed all member states to join the scheme by 2021.64 
 
Supporting the international transport industry seems to be coherent with the EU trade 
objectives but contradictory to the environmental goals. This situation calls for the 
application of Art. 21(3) TEU, in order to clarify and ensure consistency. The Treaties do not 
provide more details on how this should be achieved. Overall, the EU’s effectiveness in 
international transports remains rather weak. 
 
Labels and standards 
 
Ecolabels and standards, for which ISO definitions have been provided above, influence 
decisions of both manufacturers and consumer representatives and, in different markets 
around the world, they often entail different requirements. As demonstrated in Table 3, 
labels and standards is the only category which ranks as strong. Indeed, here the EU is 
employing all the tools at its disposal. This is not surprising if one considers that labels and 
standards are essential for trade and competition, and therefore it is easier for the EU to 
be coherent and consistent. As an example, here I will be looking at environmental 
labelling. 
 
Labels and standards are usually agreed in multilateral fora such as the WTO, while they 
also constitute a core part of each FTA: in both cases they are adopted from standard-
setting organisations. Hence, both overt diffusion and procedural diffusion are strong. The 
failed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is maybe the best example of 
how labelling can contribute to the failure of trade negotiations, as different institutions 
on the two sides the Atlantic refer to different sustainability criteria and legal 
requirements.65 Both institutionalised dialogues and the physical presence of the EU have 
been considerably growing and becoming much more horizontally and vertically 
                                                          
64 ICAO, “Environmental Protection > CORSIA”, January 2019 retrieved 8 April 2019, 
https://www.icao.int/environmental-protec-tion/CORSIA/Pages/default.aspx. 
65 K. Biedenkopf & H. Walker, “USA: Oscillating Between Cooperation, Conflict and Coexistence”, 
in C. Adelle et al. (eds.), European Union External Environmental Policy, Cham, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018, pp. 297-315. 
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coherent after the Lisbon Treaty, and this policy field is one where some of the most 
effective results have been found.66 
 
Informational diffusion, and the interlinked cultural filter, both appear relatively moderate. 
The EU has been promoting the idea that eco-labels are a useful tool for market 
governance based on a multi-stakeholder approach, since the process of setting the 
criteria, monitoring and evaluation, and of the final acceptance in the market involves a 
variety of actors, from government and private companies, to consumers and 
environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Yet, the qualities of a 
comprehensive participatory framework are not appreciated everywhere in the same 
way, thus delivering different results.67 
 
Both contagion and persuasion can be qualified as moderate. As an example of the 
former, there is a rise in voluntary labels by businesses all over the world through corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), often following European standards, which entail a reduction 
of information asymmetries vis-à-vis the consumers.68 An example of the latter is the 
development of eco-labels in South Africa both for commercial requirements and 
consumers’ protection, which, as showed by a recent study, have been closely linked to 
the growing influence of EU labels and presence.69 
 
When it comes to coercion and conditionality, these are moderate because unilateral 
decisions have been limited, and this policy area is more often the result of international 
negotiations or of a participatory approach which involves businesses and civil society. 
Nonetheless, the criticism from developing countries (but not only) put forward against 
the EU with regard to its labels and standards as a market distortion or even discrimination 
                                                          
66 F. Hoffmeister, “Of Presidents, High Representatives and European Commissioners – the external 
representation of the European Union seven years after Lisbon.”, Europe and the World, vol. 1, no. 
1, 2017, pp. 1-46. 
67 F. Rubik & P. Frankl, The future of eco-labelling: making environmental product information 
systems effective, London, Routledge, 2017. 
68 A. Plank & K. Teichmann, “A facts panel on corporate social and environmental behavior: 
Decreasing information asymmetries between producers and consumers through product 
labeling.”, Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 177, no. 3, 2018, pp. 868-877. 
69 M. Struwig & C. Adendorff, “Consumers’ perception of eco-labels in South Africa.”, Athens 
Journal of Business & Economics, vol. 4, no. 2, 2018, pp. 163-178. 
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has always been considerable; notably questions such as the imposition of the 
precautionary principle to enter the EU market or the criteria for GMOs.70 
 
Both legal approximation and the partial adoption of the acquis, with specific reference 
to environmental labelling, are moderate, once again with a stronger geographical 
relevance in ENP, EFTA and enlargement countries. For instance, they are included in all 
the Association Agreements with the Eastern ENP countries.71 To the contrary, regulatory 
standards are stronger because there is a clear EU influence that expands almost all over 
the globe, from ACP countries to developed nations such as Canada, Japan and South 
Korea, as duly regulated by the respective FTAs currently in place. In most cases, during 
the trade negotiations, the EU standards and labels are the ones to prevail showing strong 
effectiveness.72 
 
In conclusion, this is the field in which the EU has proven the strongest effectiveness in 
managing the trade-climate nexus. 
 
Interpretation of the findings 
 
Looking at Table 3, the first impression is that overall the degree of EU effectiveness in 
managing the trade-climate nexus is quite moderate, if not weak. This result seems to 
collide with the self-declared ‘climate leadership’ – the EU does not live up to the 
expectations. Indeed, ‘labels and standards’ is the only TCA item with strong 
effectiveness, where all the tools are being deployed. It is followed by ‘international 
competitiveness’, probably as a result of the fact that there is no prioritisation among the 
TCA items, but the environment is de facto subject to trade and economic growth, while 
the other way around seems more of an exception. It is not surprising that the EU is more 
effective where it is has stronger competences, that is, on competition policy and 
unilateral standards for the internal market. For weak effectiveness, two main reasons can 
be identified: first, there are still many difficulties in dealing with demandeurs that have a 
similar bargaining power to that of the EU, and second, these policy areas are often seen 
as sensitive matters of domestic politics. 
 
                                                          
70 J. Lawrence, Governmentality in EU External Trade and Environment Policy: Between Rights and 
Market, London, Routledge, 2018, p. 102-106. 
71 Krämer, 2011, op. cit., pp. 239-244. 
72 Leal-Arcas & Alvarez Armas, 2018, op. cit. 
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The tool most deployed is procedural diffusion and the one least deployed is 
conditionality. This reflects the fact that EU influence at the global level seems to follow a 
geographical distribution: the Western Balkans and enlargement countries are the area 
where the EU is more influential, followed by the EFTA countries by force of market 
integration and lastly by the ENP countries, where the EU appears to exert more influence 
in the East compared to the South.  
 
In the context of the current crisis of multilateralism, the EU’s role in classical settings such 
as the WTO or the UNFCCC conferences is often reduced and most of the European 
successes of the last years have to be read together with the lowering of ambitions.73 In 
different sectors the EU can be more or less influential vis-à-vis the ACP, the emerging 
economies (BRICS) or the other developed nations. The findings do not seem to show a 
clear or coherent path of externalisation, but it rather appears quite disaggregated and 
often incoherent. In this sense, in the absence of a more strategic approach, the EU’s 
influence is dangerously exposed to any change of government in the partner country. 
This was evident for transatlantic relations in the shift from the Obama to the Trump 
Administration. Thus, it is legitimate to wonder, for instance, whether EU-Canada relations 
would be so fruitful and cooperative if there was not a somewhat like-minded leader such 
as Justin Trudeau. Indeed, the EU did not react effectively when Canada withdrew from 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. 
 
Overall, tools from NPE are used at 46.6% of their possibilities, while tools from MPE only at 
29.4%. This is not very surprising, given the definition of the EU as an institutionalist actor in 
this specific nexus. Indeed,  
the concept of normative power is an attempt to refocus analysis away from the 
empirical emphasis on the EU’s institutions or policies, and towards including 
cognitive processes, with both substantive and symbolic components […] the 
notion of a normative power Europe is located in a discussion of the ‘power over 
opinion’, idée force, or ‘ideological power’, and the desire to move beyond the 
debate over state-like features through an understanding of the EU’s international 
identity.74  
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This extract from Manners’ seminal article is helpful to understand that regulatory choices 
and their subsequent externalisation are the result of identity and ideology. On the one 
hand, the EU is mostly a science-driven actor (especially when compared to other 
partners, such as the US).75 On the other hand, there is an increasing public pressure on 
the matter, with numerous manifestations and ‘marches for the climate’ all over Europe: 
as a product of democracy, a growing public demand for environmental action results 
in a change of behaviour in the institutions too, making the EU more willing to engage in 
in the trade-climate nexus.76 It is a normative choice to set priorities in trade-climate and 
to push for a different direction than where the system of globalised capitalism is 
otherwise going. 
 
Overall, the combination of NPE and MPE is covering only 38.05% of its potential, thus 
leaving a gap of 61.95% of possibilities. The EU has large space to become a stronger 
actor in the trade-climate nexus if it was willing to deploy more effectively the 
mechanisms at its disposal. In this regard, the following policy recommendations aim to 
provide a starting point to think about this improvement in effectiveness.   
 
Policy recommendations  
 
“The Paris Agreement contains no cross-references to trade rules. […]  
After 2020, the Paris Agreement will leave it at the discretion 
 of the parties whether they want to include their 
 trade policy agendas in the design of their NDCs”77 
 
The assessment in this paper is based on the categorisation of the EU as an institutionalist 
actor in the trade-climate nexus. The study revealed that NPE tools seem to be generally 
more applied than MPE tools, which is not astonishing if we consider that environmental 
regulations are rooted in a primarily normative perspective. Thus, one may suggest that 
the deployment of MPE tools has to be strengthened, while bearing in mind that external 
action has to be tailored and realistically feasible. For instance, it is in the nature of the 
legal approximation to and partial adoption of the acquis to be functional only in a 
                                                          
75 S. Jasanoff, Designs on nature: Science and democracy in Europe and the United States, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 272. 
76 “Marche pour le climat : « On ne peut plus nous arrêter, un autre monde est possible », scandent 
les milliers de manifestants”, Le Soir, published 27 January 2019, retrieved 10 March 2019, 
https://www.lesoir.be/203096/article/2019-01-27/marche-pour-le-climat-ne-peut-plus-nous-
arreter-un-autre-monde-est-possible. 
77 Dröge & Schenuit, 2018, op. cit., p. 3. 
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specific area (i.e. the geographic proximity to the EU), and it would not be realistic to 
suggest an increase of these tools elsewhere. Basically, the idea is not to reach the 
maximum points of 36 for a TCA item, which would imply using all the tools in a strong 
way. What should be studied is rather a strategy to understand which tool is more efficient 
where, in which context and towards what kind of partner.  
 
The fact that conditionality is the weakest tool does not necessarily mean that it should 
be strengthened: in this policy nexus it may not be the most suitable way to achieve the 
objectives. Instead, two tools that the EU should deploy more from MPE are definitely 
persuasion and coercion. Today, a strategic combination of persuasion and cultural filter 
is strongly needed at different layers, especially with the so-called ‘like-minded partners’, 
in order to stabilise a series of partnerships and secure them from any sudden political 
change. Coercion is what the EU could and should increase in order to see more 
concrete progress, imposing unilateral restraints on import and export based on 
environmental criteria. Notably, Young argues that when the EU first tried to address the 
aviation emissions at the multilateral level, it was not successful until the EU ETS was 
unilaterally imposed and, as a result, the topic immediately went high on the ICAO 
agenda.78 Certainly, the risk of worsening the ‘trade war’ situation is high and it would be 
against the EU trade objectives, that is why coercion needs to be carefully managed and 
justified. The question itself brings us back to the original lack of prioritisation in EU trade 
and climate objectives, and the blurry legal language examined above. 
 
According to Art. 21(3) TEU, it should be up to the Council and the Commission, assisted 
by the HR/VP, to ensure the consistency among these policy areas in the external 
relations. Yet today the EU still misses a clear strategy from these institutions to manage 
the nexus and to set priorities. Ultimately, it is still up to the member states to decide on 
this prioritisation. Clearer definitions of dim concepts such as ‘sustainable development’ 
and stronger reference to science in trade and climate are urgently needed. 
 
Furthermore, when looking at the different decision-making and negotiation settings, 
trade and climate appear to be dealt with like “two solitudes”, to quote Naomi Klein.79 It 
seems, for instance, that establishing DG CLIMA was full of political symbolism but void 
                                                          
78 A.R. Young, “The European Union as a global regulator? Context and comparison”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 9, 2015, pp. 1233-1252. 
79 Klein, 2014, op. cit. 
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from an effectiveness viewpoint: climate, indeed, can never be addressed without a 
strong issue-linkage. Instead, it would be more efficient to have a specific directorate for 
climate action within the main DGs that are involved. This would not only entail a drastic 
change in bilateral negotiations of FTAs, but also in permanent EU Delegations to 
multilateral organisations, with a more efficient mainstreaming of climate. Climate 
change is an interdisciplinary and transboundary challenge, and as such, it should be 
treated also in the politico-administrative structures that are aiming to regulate it. 
 
The assessment of the EU’s effectiveness as weak to medium in the trade-climate nexus 
could open debates about the theoretical background of the EU’s actions. An 
institutionalist approach that sometimes falls into market liberalism, as Musch and De Ville 
showed for the Environmental Goods Agreement at the WTO,80 is not the best option to 
manage this nexus. To change this, the EU could review the system of accessibility and 
stakeholders’ consultations during trade negotiations, ensuring that civil society and 
environmental NGOs are heard no less than big multinational companies, insurances and 
banks. Indeed, social green (not to mention bio-environmentalist) perspectives have 
more difficulties in influencing the EU decision-making and negotiation processes, leaving 
more space for the lobbying of market liberals. This is an issue that the EU, as an institution 
which affirms democracy as a core guiding value in its external action (Art. 21(1) TEU), 
must address. The issue of democracy is also relevant concerning the (weak) role of the 
European Parliament both in trade and environmental negotiations. 
 
During 2018, a stronger quest for the integration of the Paris Agreement into every new 
trade agreement came particularly from France, and with the support of the Trade 
Commissioner Malmström who tweeted that, after Japan, also the FTAs with Mexico and 
Mercosur will entail specific clauses on the Paris Agreement.81 This seems to be a fair 
starting point for the establishment of the trade-climate policy nexus at higher level. This 
approach would open space for debates about operationalising the concept of 
‘conditional liberalisation upon carbon footprint’, which basically means making trade 
relations conditional to concrete actions for emissions reduction. 
 
                                                          
80 Musch & De Ville, 2019, op. cit. 
81 “EU Tells Trump: No Paris Climate Deal, No Free Trade”, Forbes, published 8 February 2018, 
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Another recommendation regards the process of learning. Analysing externalisation tools, 
it seems to be always the EU persuading someone else, but what about the EU learning 
from the best practices of other countries or international organisations such as the strong 
Australian labelling for local products or the Canadian Environmental Impact 
Assessment? Most of the procedural diffusion or even the cultural filter seems to be one-
way only, without spaces for mutual learning. 
 
Finally, it seems that the TCA lack other essential items which could constitute a real 
revolutionary approach, such as the local content requirements (LCRs). As shown in the 
WTO solar panels cases of the EU and Japan against Ontario, or of China against the EU, 
the core issue is that LCRs can easily be accused of not respecting the WTO core principle 
of non-discrimination. At the same time, they play a key role in that part of the ‘green 
revolution’ and ‘energy transition’ narrative that aims to relaunch the economy, create 
new jobs and counter industrial delocalisation. In a way, the LCRs question is connecting 
environmental protection with the rights of workers and, as such, needs to be 
reconsidered by the EU. 
 
Conclusions 
“When you invest in development, when you invest in the fight 
 against climate change, you also invest in your own security”82 
Federica Mogherini, HR/VP of the EU, 2017 
 
“No Paris Agreement, no trade agreement”83 
Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, 2018 
 
This paper addressed the question of to what extent the EU is effectively managing the 
trade-climate nexus by using trade to support climate action in its external relations. It 
showed that, overall, the EU is moderately to weakly effective in using trade to support 
climate action. The discrepancies between TCA items is significant. Also, in the 
deployment of tools, there is a clear prevalence of NPE that should be further explored. 
 
                                                          
82 F. Mogherini, “Mogherini to Mattis in Munich: climate investments boost security”, Climate Home 
News, published 20 February 2017, retrieved 24 January 2019, 
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Previous research has highlighted that international trade can be an elusive mechanism, 
which gives the impression that ecological sustainability is conserved at local level thanks 
to bio-mass imports and sink capacity from elsewhere. In this way, it can hide the 
responsibility for the ecological effects of production and consumption.84 The reduction 
of GHGs and many other pollutants in Europe has to be understood not only as a result 
of the growing internal legislation, but also as complementary to the offsetting of 
Europe’s carbon footprint in other countries. Global trade geographically relocates the 
polluting emissions.85 Europe has a stake in growing emissions in developing countries.  
 
Trade is probably the most powerful instrument for the EU, nonetheless its influence can 
vary greatly according to geographical proximity and relative power relations. Indeed, 
“the utility of the EU’s regulatory power resources is context speciﬁc”.86 For this reason, 
also the trade-climate nexus should not aim at finding one standardised approach, but 
rather adapt to the context and the third parties involved. This may entail great varieties 
in the application of MPE/NPE tools. In other words, with regard to Table 3, it is not 
important that each tool is used in a strong way, but it is more relevant to have a strong 
assessment of the TCA item at the end of the row, thus over 25 points. Externalisation 
tools should be deployed maximising their utility, with a comprehensive overview of all 
of them, for instance bearing in mind how persuasion and regulatory standards have to 
proceed supporting each other and so forth with the other tools. Moreover, the 
framework applied for this research also has the potential to be generalised to the 
analysis of other policy nexi, e.g. trade and labour rights.  
 
There are some problems in prioritisation, in the definition of key concepts and in the 
‘weak vs. strong sustainability’ approaches that constitute ground for misunderstanding 
and mismanagement of the trade-climate nexus. Promoting economic globalisation 
increases the magnitude of trade flows which, as long as connected to fossil fuels, results 
in the worsening of climate change.87 As an encouraging example, the Sustainability 
Impact Assessment for the new EU-Japan FTA reported that “it is possible to conclude 
that there is no negative impact on greenhouse gases and CO₂ emissions from the FTA. 
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In fact, the FTA favours relatively less energy and emission intensive sectors, leading to a 
reallocation towards these cleaner sectors instead”.88 There is space for the EU to be a 
strong actor in building and managing the trade-climate nexus at the international level, 
but only if the EU is prepared to seriously questioning itself. 
 
  
                                                          
88 European Commission, “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (Executive Summary) Free Trade 
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